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Executive summary 
Despite the growth of lobbying in the EU over the 
past two decades, the EU has taken a rather laissez-
faire approach to regulating lobbying activity. While 
the European Parliament (EP) is in many ways more 
transparent and more accessible than many of the 
EU’s national parliaments, the code of conduct for 
lobbyists and the Parliament’s own rules of procedure 
are rather vague. As a result of the ‘cash for laws’ 
scandal, the EP President, Jerzy Buzek, has 
established a working group to draw up a new set of 
rules to govern the access and behaviour of lobbyists 
and to formulate a code of conduct for Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs). The working group 
is currently considering seven proposals put forward 
by Jerzy Buzek, including a mandatory lobbying 
register for all EU institutions; a strengthening of 
MEPs’ declarations of financial interests, with more 
frequent updates; a code of conduct for MEPs; a 
‘legislative footprint’ for rapporteurs and tougher 
sanctions for non-compliance with these rules. While 
the reform proposal, as it stands now, offers a 
significant improvement of the Parliament’s current 
rules, it does not go far enough, however.  
This Policy Brief analyses the shortcomings of the 
Parliament’s current Rules of Procedure and provides 
suggestions as to how it can improve both its dealings 
with lobbyists and the rules governing MEPs. It 
recommends a new code of conduct for MEPs; the  
 
prohibition of any gifts and travel by lobbyists for 
MEPs; clearer rules regarding MEPs’ potential 
conflicts of interest and disclosure of financial 
interests; creating an ethics committee and 
introducing more formalised ways of consulting 
external stakeholders.  
Introduction 
The recent ‘cash for laws’ scandal has brought ethics 
and transparency reforms back on to the front burner. 
The lobbying sting involved four MEPs who were 
accused of agreeing to accept money from Sunday 
Times journalists, posing as lobbyists, in return for 
watering down banking reform legislation. Presenting 
themselves as banking lobbyists, the journalists 
contacted some 60 MEPs and attempted to bribe them 
with offers of cash in return for tabling amendments 
to draft EU legislation. While the allegations against 
the four MEPs are extremely serious, the number of 
MEPs who agreed to accept the bribes is rather small, 
given that around 60 MEPs were initially contacted. 
Putting aside the individual cases of the four MEPs 
implicated, the question is how the European 
Parliament will use the momentum to reform its own 
Rules of Procedure and dealings with lobbyists. As a 
result of the scandal, the EP has established a working 
group, under the leadership of the EP President Jerzy 
Buzek, to prepare a tighter code of conduct for 
lobbyists and improve MEPs’ declarations.    2 | MAJA KLUGER RASMUSSEN  
 
A resource-dependent relationship 
Lobbying is essential to the functioning of the 
European Parliament, particularly when MEPs are 
attempting to gauge the impact of policies on specific 
sectors. Interest groups’ provision of information and 
technical expertise to MEPs often ensure more 
informed policy formulation. While theoretically 
consistent with the ideals of democracy, the influence 
of interest groups can, in practice, lead to political 
corruption (as was the case in the ‘cash for laws’ 
scandal) and inequality of representation. The recent 
lobbying scandal is by no means a phenomenon solely 
confined to the EP, but perhaps bribery is more likely 
to go unnoticed there than in national parliaments, due 
to the limited media coverage of MEPs. It is well 
known that MEPs are not held directly accountable to 
the public. EP elections are fought on national, rather 
than European issues. They are often treated as mid-
term national beauty contests used as a stick to beat 
an incumbent government with. There is no EU-wide 
media, which makes it difficult to reach a large 
audience. When EU affairs are covered in the national 
media they are given national frames of interpretation, 
reaffirming the role of the nation state rather than 
legitimising the EU. The lack of a direct link between 
MEPs and their electorates, combined with the low 
visibility of EU affairs nationally, means that MEPs 
are not constantly held accountable for their activities 
to the same extent as national politicians. 
Currently, lobbying is not regulated in the EU in any 
uniform or consistent manner, although the European 
Commission and the EP are currently working on 
establishing a joint Transparency Register to be put in 
place in June 2011. However, as it stands now, the 
European Commission and the EP have very different 
ways of consulting interest representatives. The EP’s 
consultation of stakeholders is not institutionalised, as 
it is to some degree in the European Commission with 
the social dialogue in employment affairs and its 
various experts and high-level groups. While the 
European Commission often spends 3-4 years 
preparing a proposal with advice from a large number 
of expert and high-level groups, a rapporteur in the 
EP has only a few months to prepare a report. Hence, 
committee rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs are 
particularly obvious lobbying targets and often lean 
heavily on interest groups for information when 
writing reports. These MEPs are also considered to be 
the main opinion-shapers of Parliament’s stance as a 
whole. This raises the question of how rapporteurs 
and other key MEPs gather information and evidence 
when drafting a committee report.  
Much of the Parliament’s work involves highly 
technical issues, where expert knowledge is required. 
MEPs manage with few assistants and policy 
advisors, who are not necessarily experts on the 
dossier under consideration. MEPs have an extremely 
busy agenda and spend most of their time living out 
of a suitcase travelling between Strasbourg, Brussels 
and their national constituency. Lobbyists are 
therefore welcome guests in the offices of busy 
MEPs. Most MEPs, assistants and parliamentary 
policy advisors cannot imagine doing their work 
without information provided by lobby groups. 
Rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in particular rely 
extensively on interest groups to provide them with 
information and to translate complex and technical 
information into brief ‘digestible’ notes. Parliament’s 
extensive workload gives considerable scope for 
lobbyists to influence MEPs, assistants and policy 
advisors. As one policy advisor affirmed: 
We cannot do our work without the information 
from interest groups. They send us amendments 
and voting lists prior to the committee and 
plenary vote. Sometimes it is very tempting to 
copy and paste their amendments and voting lists. 
I mean we are all so busy in Parliament.
2  
When drafting the committee reports, rapporteurs 
routinely seek out key interest groups to solicit their 
views. It is often reported that representatives of 
European associations have written large parts of the 
rapporteur’s report and the amendments proposed by 
committee members.
3 Informed estimates claim that 
about 80% of all amendments launched in the 
committees stem directly from interest representatives 
and the inspiration behind the last 20% often comes 
from outside Parliament.
4 While the tabling of 
amendments stemming from interest groups does not 
necessarily ensure their adoption in Parliament, the 
figures demonstrate that interest groups play an 
important role in the Parliament’s work. Indeed, it is 
not unusual to see MEPs from different political 
groups suggesting identical amendments with 
identical justifications. This highlights the fact that 
committee amendments are not only subject to intense 
negotiations between committee members, but also 
between MEPs and affected interest organisations. 
Parliament’s current Rules of Procedure 
and their shortcomings 
The EP is the only EU institution with a system of 
accreditation for lobbyists, consisting of both a 
                                                      
2 Interview, EP policy advisor, 1 September 2010. 
3 Hix, S. and B. Hoyland (2010), The Political System of 
the European Union, 3rd edition Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
4 Earnshaw, D. and D. Judge (2006), “No simple 
dichotomies: lobbyists and the European Parliament”, The 
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register and a code of conduct. It is limited to the 
collection of a minimum amount of information from 
lobbyists in return for an annual pass granting its 
holder access to the Parliament buildings. An interest 
group’s ability to obtain an EP pass means that it is 
relatively easy for lobbyists to follow EP meetings 
and approach MEPs and assistants compared to 
parliamentary access in some domestic parliaments. 
As a representative from the British Chamber of 
Commerce explained: 
Westminster is much more antiquated. There are 
practical differences [between Westminster and 
the EP]. In the UK, you can’t get a pass to 
Westminster. If you want to enter Westminster’s 
premises, an MP has to get you and walk you 
around. Here [in the EP], you can get a pass.
5  
The EP has 4051 accredited lobbyists (persons), and 
1797 interest organisations listed on its website (as of 
May 2011). EP pass-holders must conform to a set of 
rules listed in the EP’s Rules of Procedure (Annex X), 
mainly: 
•  state the interest or interests they represent in 
contacts with MEPs, their staff or officials of 
Parliament; 
•  refrain from any action designed to obtain 
information dishonestly; 
•  not claim any formal relationship with Parliament 
in any dealings with third parties; 
•  not circulate for  profit to third parties copies of 
documents obtained from Parliament  
•  not offer any gifts. 
A breach of the code may lead to the withdrawal of 
the pass. While the EP is the only EU institution to 
have introduced an accreditation system and a code of 
conduct for lobbyists, the rules are too broad to be 
properly enforced. What classifies as ‘gifts’ is 
unspecified. Should lobby companies funding and 
holding public hearings and receptions within the 
Parliament be considered as gifts? Should MEPs 
being invited to visit tobacco farms by the tobacco 
industry, with everything paid for, be considered as 
gifts? ‘Gifts’, or special benefits, are not uncommon 
in the EP. MEPs and their assistants frequently 
receive gifts from lobbying companies, such as free 
football tickets, dinners and drinks receptions, 
conference invitations with everything paid for and 
free cinema tickets. For instance, Warner Brothers 
invited MEPs along to a food and wine reception 
followed by a pre-screening of the latest Harry Potter 
movie, in November 2010. Before the movie, a 
                                                      
5 Interview, British Chamber of Commerce, 11 November 
2010. 
representative of Warner Brothers briefly explained 
their position on an ongoing directive on copyright 
rules. While MEPs and assistants are aware that they 
are being lobbied, they will most likely remember to 
consult this lobby group when Parliament deals with 
copyright rules. Raising awareness and visibility is 
often the purpose behind interest groups giving MEPs 
gifts. While these lobbying events may be beneficial 
to MEPs to raise their awareness of particular issues, 
it becomes a concern when MEPs receive gifts from 
the companies and associations they are meant to be 
regulating.  
As stated above, under the Parliament’s current Rules 
of Procedure, MEPs and parliamentary assistants are 
expected to refrain from accepting any gifts or 
benefits in the performance of their duties. MEPs are 
required to make a detailed declaration of their 
professional activities and financial interests. Despite 
being publicly available on the Parliament’s website, 
these declarations often contain limited and irrelevant 
information about MEPs’ activities. Furthermore, they 
appear in a rather unprofessional format as they are 
handwritten by the MEPs and only appear in their 
own language. Rarely do MEPs declare the small gifts 
and hospitality they receive from businesses with a 
vested interest in the work they do as legislators, or 
give an extensive account of their external 
parliamentary activities. For instance, the rapporteur 
on the reduction of CO2 emissions from light 
commercial vehicles Directive is also chairing the 
“Forum for the Automobile and Society”, which is a 
forum run jointly by the European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (ACEA), the European 
Council for Motor Trades & Repairs (CECRA), the 
European Association of Automotive Suppliers 
(CLEPA), la Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile (FIA) and the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (JAMA). This industry 
forum is an arena for debate, bringing together 
motoring organisations and key policymakers from 
major legislative institutions. Although this 
information is available on the forum’s website, the 
rapporteur fails to declare this in his parliamentary 
declaration. In this instance, I would question where a 
rapporteur chairing an automobile industry forum 
obtains the bulk of his information, and whether or 
not there may be a conflict of interests.  
While MEPs’ active engagement with outside 
interests (such as board positions or remunerated 
professional activities), either paid or voluntary, 
allows them to gain insight into specific policy areas 
and sectors, it may compromise their impartiality and 
objectivity inside the EP. This raises the question of 
whether or not an ethics and transparency reform 
should prohibit MEPs from doing any paid or 
voluntary external parliamentary activities that 4 | MAJA KLUGER RASMUSSEN  
 
involves lobbying or that may lead to a conflict of 
interests. Should MEPs, for instance, be allowed to sit 
on the board of a bank or an industry forum, while at 
the same time being able to take on key parliamentary 
roles, such as rapporteur or shadow rapporteurships? 
The question feeds into the heated debate of what 
constitutes a lobbyist. One could argue that MEPs 
themselves are, indirectly, acting as lobbyists when 
they are engaged with specific interests in their 
external parliamentary activity. Evidently, if MEPs or 
their assistants sit on the board of a company, they are 
likely to have an interest in promoting the views of 
the specific company and to act as its conduit.  
Should MEPs not represent the people who voted for 
them rather than a specific industry, company, NGO 
or any other interest organisation? The answer is not 
unequivocal. Politicians are often drawn into politics 
because they want to fight for the interest of a specific 
sector. ‘Second jobs’ or other external parliamentary 
activities also provide MEPs with the opportunity to 
gain  more specialised expertise on specific issues on 
which they are regulating. However, it becomes 
problematic when MEPs are too involved with the 
outside interests they are meant to regulate. One 
possible solution could be to prohibit MEPs from 
taking up key posts in Parliament (rapporteur, shadow 
rapporteur and coordinator) in areas where they are 
directly engaged with outside interests (e.g. either 
doing paid or voluntary work for a specific interest). 
A prerequisite for discovering actual or potential 
conflicts of interest is of course that the Parliament’s 
own Rules of Procedure are properly enforced and 
monitored. As things stands now, some MEPs fail to 
report the full scale of their external parliamentary 
activities and financial interests.  
Reform suggestions 
The shortcomings of Parliament’s current Rules of 
Procedure demonstrate that there is ample room for 
improvement. The Parliament’s newly established 
working group, chaired by Jerzy Buzek, should 
consider including the following reform suggestions: 
Reconsider the definition of a lobbyist 
Exactly what constitutes a lobbyist is the subject of 
heated debate. The definition of a lobbyist matters as 
it prescribes who and what activity is to be subject to 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Rule 9, Article 4) as 
well as the forthcoming common Transparency 
register between the European Parliament and the 
European Commission. According to the EP’s 
Constitutional Affairs’ (AFCO) committee report on 
the common Transparency Register (adopted by the 
AFCO committee on 19 April 2011), the scope of the 
register covers all activities carried out with the 
objective of directly or indirectly influencing the 
policy formulation or implementation and decision-
making processes of the European institutions. The 
following actors and activities are, however, excluded 
from the scope of the register: 
•  Activities concerning the provision of legal and 
other professional advice (such as that provided 
by lawyers) when they relate to the exercise of a 
client’s fundamental rights to a fair trial or the 
right to defence in administrative proceedings.  
•  Activities of the social partners as actors in the 
social dialogue when acting within the role 
assigned to them in the treaties. 
•  EU member states’ governments, third country 
governments, international intergovernmental 
organisations and their diplomatic missions.  
•  Churches, as well as local, regional and municipal 
authorities, except their representational offices, 
legal bodies and networks created to represent 
them towards the EU institutions.  
Excluding national governments, or what could be 
called ‘institutional lobbyists’, from the scope of the 
register is not unproblematic, given national 
governments’ extensive lobbying of MEPs. As an EP 
policy advisor explained: 
People underestimate the amount of contact 
MEPs have with their permanent representations. 
The lobbying from the UK permanent 
representation is massive. They brief us about 
their position […]; they have a huge arsenal of 
civil servants behind them.
6 
National governments often lobby their national 
MEPs by furnishing them with policy briefings and 
inviting them to receptions. The British permanent 
representation is particularly known for lobbying not 
only their EP national delegations, but also key MEPs 
(rapporteur, shadows and coordinators) working on a 
dossier of specific interest to the UK. On the 
Maternity Leave Directive, for instance, all the key 
MEPs reported that they had been contacted by the 
attaché in charge of the dossier at the British 
permanent representation, who provided them with 
tailored briefings. Indeed, many permanent 
representations have a full-time parliamentary attaché 
employed to follow EP affairs closely and to maintain 
contact with their national MEPs. Should that be 
considered as a lobbying activity? 
Introduce a code of conduct for MEPs 
Unlike European Commissioners, the EP does not 
have a code of conduct for MEPs. The 
                                                      
6 Interview, ALDE policy advisor 29 November 2010. LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IS A NECESSARY EVIL | 5 
 
Commissioners’ code of conduct is very detailed and 
states explicitly that: 
•  Commissioners may neither engage in any other 
professional activity, whether paid or unpaid, nor 
accept any form of payment for delivering 
speeches or taking part in conferences.  
•  Commissioners must declare any financial 
interests or assets which might create a conflict of 
interests in the performance of their duties.  
•  To prevent any potential risk of conflict of 
interests, Commissioners are required to declare 
their spouses’ professional activities and relevant 
financial holdings.  
While European Commissioners are subject to 
numerous and very strict rules on the disclosure of 
their financial interests, the EP’s Rules of Procedure 
pales in comparison to that of the Commissioners. 
While the Commissioners’ declaration of interests 
includes a detailed account of their outside activities 
(posts held currently and over the previous ten years 
in foundations and educational institutions), financial 
interests (shares, stocks and assets) and spouses’ 
professional activities; the information provided by 
MEPs in their financial declaration is often kept to a 
minimum and updated only once a year. MEPs should 
be required to update their declaration of interests 
whenever their situation changes and disclose the 
same information as Commissioners.  
Prohibit gifts and travel 
The EP needs to spell out what is considered as a gift 
and under what circumstances MEPs are allowed to 
receive gifts. Gifts, free meals and travel (such as free 
football tickets, conference invitations with 
everything paid for, cinema tickets and receptions) are 
a common lobbyist means of influencing MEPs. Not 
all interest groups have the budget and staff levels 
available to fund and arrange such activities, which 
puts non-governmental organisations at a particular 
disadvantage compared to businesses. 
Unlike the European Parliament, the European 
Commission and the US Congress have clear rules on 
the issue of gifts, from which the EP could take 
inspiration. According to the European Commission’s 
rules, Commissioners are not allowed to accept gifts 
of a value of more than €150. The rules of the US 
House of Representatives goes even further by 
banning lobbyists from giving meals, gifts and trips of 
any value to politicians and their staff. In the US 
Congress ‘sit-down-meals’, sports and entertainment 
tickets are illegal. The only type of gathering with 
food and drinks not considered gifts are ‘finger food’ 
events which are open to the public, such as a trade 
union conference. In the US Congress, free travel is 
also severely restricted. Lobbyists are allowed to pay 
for a one-day trip to a congressman if he or she is 
invited to a conference to make a speech. These trips 
need to be pre-approved by an ethics committee, and 
the sponsors, costs and itineraries posted on the 
Congress website.  
While lobbying regulation in the EP and the US 
Congress is quite different, the lobbying activities are 
similar, with lobbyists in both Brussels and 
Washington exchanging drafts of legislation and 
holding informal conferences and receptions in 
pleasant locations. Both the Congress and the EP have 
an elite pluralistic interest group system, where 
interest groups have to compete for politicians’ 
attention without being subject to any formal 
hearings. Although MEPs are not dependent on 
moneyed interests for their re-election, they are 
dependent on interest groups for information. Much 
can therefore be learned from the way the US 
Congress regulates its dealings with lobbyists. As the 
recent ‘cash for law’ scandal has demonstrated, it is 
clearly not sufficient to base lobbying regulation and 
MEPs’ declarations on trust and self-regulation. There 
needs to be a clear rules and enforcement mechanism 
backed up by higher penalties for MEPs, EP staff and 
lobbyists if they fail to comply with the rules.  
Prohibit MEPs from taking up key posts if they 
have a conflict of interest 
MEPs should be prohibited from taking up key EP 
posts (i.e. committee chair, rapporteur, shadow 
rapporteur and coordinator) when there is a potential 
conflict of interest. MEPs ought to declare any actual 
or possible conflict of interest, and cannot become 
rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs in areas where they 
are directly engaged with outside interests affected by 
the legislation. For instance, it should not be possible 
for an MEP sitting on the board of a bank to be either 
a rapporteur or shadow rapporteur on a directive 
concerning banking regulation.  
The current parliamentary rules require MEPs to 
make a detailed declaration of their professional 
activities and financial interests. MEPs often fail to 
provide the necessary information. The EP must 
therefore ensure that these rules are properly enforced 
by establishing a body dedicated to monitoring the 
accuracy of information provided by MEPs, assistants 
and lobbyists. Furthermore, as Jerzy Buzek has 
proposed in his recent anti-corruption plan, MEPs 
should be obliged to update their declarations of 
interest every time a situation changes rather than just 
once a year. This declaration must also include the 
professional activity and financial holdings (financial 
interests and assets) of MEPs’ spouses whenever it 
may entail a conflict of interests. The declarations 6 | MAJA KLUGER RASMUSSEN  
 
should appear in at least four languages (their own 
language, plus English, French and German). 
Introduce a ‘legislative footprint’ and ‘lobbying 
contact reports’ 
The EP must facilitate a system whereby the public 
can see what interest representatives MEPs consult. 
This could, for instance, be in the form of what 
Alexander Stubb (former Finnish MEP) has termed a 
‘legislative footprint’, whereby rapporteurs working 
on legislative texts must list all individuals and 
interest groups they have consulted, or from which 
they have received advice, during the preparation of 
their report. Furthermore, the British Conservative 
MEPs’ recent introduction of a ‘lobbying contact 
report’ could be extended to all MEPs. The Tory 
MEPs publish a list on their party’s website 
registering any formal prearranged meetings held with 
lobbyists every month. The information published 
lists the MEP’s name, the meeting date, the name of 
the lobbyist(s), their organisation (and clients, if 
applicable) and the issue discussed. The latter only 
needs to be a one-sentence summary, such as ‘food 
labelling to consumers’. A ‘legislative footprint’ for 
rapporteurs and their assistants and a ‘lobbying 
contact report’ for all MEPs and their assistants would 
bring additional transparency to the policy process 
and make it possible for MEPs’ constituents to see 
which interest groups their MEPs have consulted.  
Introduce more formalised ways of consulting 
stakeholders  
There is currently no uniform way of consulting 
stakeholders in the EP. It is left to individual MEPs to 
decide how they want to consult relevant 
stakeholders. While most MEPs are open to meetings 
with interest groups, some key MEPs (rapporteurs and 
shadow rapporteurs) sometimes refuse to see certain 
interest groups. For instance, during the first reading 
of the regulation on food information to consumers, 
certain shadow rapporteurs persistently declined to 
meet with representatives from the food industry. This 
is problematic as key MEPs (rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs) should have an obligation to consult 
affected stakeholders regardless of whether or not 
they agree with their views from the outset. The devil 
of EU legislation is in the detail and often interest 
groups (whether private or public) are able to alert 
MEPs to aspects of the Commission’s proposal they 
might not previously have been aware of. While it is 
not possible for MEPs and their assistants to consult 
all interests affected by a regulation or a directive, key 
MEPs should have an obligation to at least consult 
interest groups from both sides of the debate. One 
suggestion to secure wide consultation of affected 
stakeholders could be to conduct online consultations. 
For instance, the EP could make a folder on each 
committee’s website, where interest groups can 
upload their position papers, amendments and voting 
recommendations to MEPs within a given deadline. 
This deadline could be set three weeks before the 
rapporteur is due to hand in his or her first draft 
report, for instance. In order to avoid information 
overload, interest group position papers could be 
limited to 1-2 pages, and could follow a format set up 
by the EP. MEPs and assistants could furthermore 
upload any emails, amendments or position papers 
forwarded to them by interest groups. This form of 
stakeholder consultation would allow MEPs to 
familiarise themselves with the various stakeholders’ 
positions and for the public to see the issues at stake 
on specific pieces of legislation.  
The above reform suggestions demonstrate that 
various aspects should be considered when reforming 
the rules governing lobbyists, MEPs and 
parliamentary staff. Parliament’s current Rules of 
Procedure are too vague to be properly enforced and 
do not go far enough in addressing issues such as 
MEPs’ potential conflicts of interest, in defining what 
constitutes a gift and introducing minimum standards 
for consulting outside stakeholders.  
As Jerzy Buzek expressed in an interview to the 
EUobserver on 31 March 2011, there is a certain 
irony in the fact of MEPs examining the European 
Commission’s new Code of Conduct for 
Commissioners when there is no equivalent for MEPs 
themselves. While Jerzy Buzek’s working group’s 
reform proposals are still to be published in June 
2011, the seven-point reform proposal he puts 
forward is still a long way from addressing the 
shortcomings of the Parliament’s current Rules of 
Procedure. It is my hope that the working group will 
also consider the proposals put forward in this Policy 
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